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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell
I.

INTRODUCTION

Hard cases, it is said, make bad law. Criminal prosecutions for child
molestation and abuse are likely the hardest cases of all. Apart from
their horrific facts, they present tremendous evidentiary challenges to
prosecutors, primarily because of the victims' youth. Consequently,
Georgia's appellate courts have repeatedly fashioned new evidentiary
rules to assist prosecutors in such cases. Whether these hard cases
make bad law no doubt depends on one's perspective. Without question,
however, appeals involving child molestation and abuse continue to
make new law, and the current survey period was no exception.
II.

OBJECTIONS

Several cases decided during the survey period illustrate the proper
ways to object to the admission of evidence. First, the court of appeals,
following the lead of the supreme court's decision in Sharpe v. Department of Transportation,' emphatically reaffirmed the contemporaneous
objection rule, which requires that a party object timely and properly to
inadmissible evidence. In Sharpe the supreme court expanded the
contemporaneous objection rule and barred the use of a subsequent
motion to strike to attack illegal evidence. 2 In Macon-Bibb County
Board of Tax Assessors v. J.C. Penney, Inc.,' the board claimed the
superior court erred when it denied motions for directed verdict on the
grounds that the taxpayer presented no competent evidence of the fair
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2. Id. at 267, 476 S.E.2d at 723.
3. 239 Ga. App. 322, 521 S.E.2d 234 (1999).
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market value of the property at issue. The board claimed a directed
verdict was appropriate because the taxpayer's expert testimony was not
based on applicable Georgia law. However, the board did not object to
the testimony at the time it was offered.4 The court of appeals held that
by failing to make a contemporaneous objection, the board waived its
right to contend that the expert's testimony should have been excluded
from evidence and could not, by way of a motion for directed verdict,
attack that testimony.5
In Crosby v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.,' the trial court instructed the
jury to disregard plaintiff's expert's testimony on the grounds that the
expert gave several opinions that were not disclosed during discovery.
Defendant did not object to this testimony immediately but later moved
to strike the testimony. The trial court granted the motion.7 This, the
court of appeals held, was error.8 The contemporaneous objection rule
required defendant to object to the testimony at the time it was given.
In the absence of an objection, a party cannot later attack the testimony
by a motion to strike?
Motions in limine, although valuable tools to resolve evidentiary
disputes prior to trial or out of the presence of the jury, do not necessarily relieve a party from making appropriate objections at trial. In Ward
v. State," defendant moved in limine to prevent the prosecution from
referring to him in closing argument as a "career criminal." The trial
court denied the motion. In his closing argument, the prosecutor made
several references to defendant's vocation as a burglar but did not
specifically argue that because of defendant's prior convictions the jury
should infer that he was a career criminal." The court of appeals
conceded that a party does not waive an objection to inadmissible
evidence by failing to object to the admission of that evidence at trial if
12
that evidence was the subject of an unsuccessful motion in limine.
However, a motion in limine only preserves for review matters specifically raised by the motion. In Ward the court, perhaps making a fine
distinction, concluded that the prosecutor's precise references to
defendant's previous criminal activity were not specifically addressed by

4. Id. at 323, 521 S.E.2d at 235.
5. Id.
6. 240 Ga. App. 857, 524 S.E.2d 313 (1999).
7. Id. at 857-58, 524 S.E.2d at 316-17.
8. Id. at 858, 524 S.E.2d at 317.
9. Id. The court also held that "exclusion of relevant and material evidence is not an
appropriate remedy for curing a discovery omission or abuse." Id.
10. 238 Ga. App. 540, 519 S.E.2d 304 (1999).
11. Id. at 542, 519 S.E.2d at 305.
12. Id., 519 S.E.2d at 306.
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defendant's motion, and because defendant did not object when those
references were made, he waived the right to raise that issue on
appeal. "

The court of appeals also reaffirmed during the survey period that a
party waives the right to object to the admission of evidence that was
the subject of a motion in limine14 if the party fails to obtain a ruling on
the motion from the trial court.
In Holder v. State, 5 the court of appeals addressed the requirement
that a party make an appropriate proffer when the trial court rules
evidence inadmissible. In Holder defendant contended that the trial
court improperly sustained an objection to a question intended to
establish the reason defendant took the action that he did. The trial
court ruled that the evidence was hearsay. On appeal, defendant
contended that the evidence was admissible to explain his conduct.
However, defendant did not advance this as a basis for the admission of
the evidence at trial. Thus, although the trial court was aware of the
substance of the evidence, the court was not aware of the reason it had
been tendered. 6 Because defendant failed to make an appropriate
proffer, the court of appeals held that he could not raise that issue on
appeal.' 7
III.

JUDICIAL NOTICE

In Enchanted Valley R.V Resort, Ltd. v. Weese,' 8 defendants contended that plaintiff failed to introduce evidence of regulations promulgated
by the Georgia Department of Human Resources.' 9 The court of
appeals held that it was not necessary for plaintiffs to tender the
regulations because the trial court properly took judicial notice of the
regulations.2" Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section
24-1-4,21 the court reasoned, requires a trial court to take judicial notice
of regulations published under authority by the Secretary of State.22
The Administrative Procedure Act requires the Department of Human
Resources to promulgate its regulations in the manner prescribed by the

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Zehner v. State, 241 Ga. App. 345, 345-46, 525 S.E.2d 416, 417 (1999).
242 Ga. App. 479, 529 S.E.2d 907 (2000).
Id. at 482, 529 S.E.2d at 911.
Id., 529 S.E.2d at 910.
241 Ga. App. 415, 526 S.E.2d 124 (1999).

19. Id. at 419, 526 S.E.2d at 128.
20. Id., 526 S.E.2d at 128-29.
21.
22.

O.C.G.A. § 24-1-4 (1995).
241 Ga. App. at 419, 526 S.E.2d at 128.

266

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

Act.23 The Act also requires the Secretary of State to publish the
24
regulations as the "Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia."
Thus, because the regulations were published in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act, the trial court was required to take
judicial notice of those regulations.
IV.
A.

RELEVANCY

Relevancy of ExtrinsicAct Evidence

In the thirteen years the author has surveyed Georgia appellate
decisions, the determination of the relevancy of extrinsic act evidence
has been the most frequently addressed evidentiary issue. Accordingly,
some background discussion is appropriate. Evidence is extrinsic when
it concerns conduct on occasions other than the one at issue. As a
general rule, extrinsic act evidence is inadmissible. 5 However, like the
rule against hearsay, the rule against extrinsic act evidence is known
more for its exceptions than its flat prohibition. Extrinsic act evidence
may be admissible for a substantive purpose, such as when a prosecutor
tenders evidence of a similar transaction, usually a prior criminal
offense. This evidence is used to prove a defendant's motive or intent
when he committed the charged offense, or it may be admissible to
impeach or bolster a witness, such as evidence of a felony conviction to
impeach a witness' character. Sometimes evidence that may appear to
be extrinsic may not, in the often arcane world of evidence, actually be
extrinsic. For example, the res gestae doctrine, although typically
thought of as an exception to the rule against hearsay, is often used to
admit evidence that, although not directly related to the transaction at
issue, is close enough to be admitted.
For years Georgia courts have routinely and liberally admitted, for
substantive purposes, evidence of similar but totally unrelated transactions in criminal cases. However, as discussed in previous surveys, the
27
26
Georgia Supreme Court, in Stephens v. State and Williams v. State
tightened the rules governing the admissibility of similar transaction
evidence in criminal cases.
In Stephens the supreme court held that
the prosecution cannot rely solely on a certified copy of a prior conviction

23. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-13-2(1), (6), 50-13-3 (1998).
24. Id. §§ 50-13-3(b), 50-13-5, 50-13-7.
25. Id. § 24-2-2 (1995).
26. 261 Ga. 467, 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991).
27. 261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).
28. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 45 MERCER L. REV. 229, 231 (1994); Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 44 MERCER L. REV. 213, 216-20 (1993).
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when seeking to use that conviction as similar transaction evidence.29
Rather, the prosecution must offer evidence proving the requisite degree
of similarity'or connection between the extrinsic act and the charged
offense. 30 In Williams the supreme court, in a dramatic departure from
prior practice, held that the prosecution must prove, prior to trial, three
elements before similar transaction evidence can be admitted.3' First,
the prosecution must prove the relevance of the independent transaction
to a legitimate issue. Second, the prosecution must prove that the
defendant committed the independent offense or act. Third, the
prosecution must prove a sufficient connection or similarity between the
The trial court must
prior act or offense and the charged offense.
then make a specific determination that the prosecution has carried its
burden of proving each of the three elements.
Williams and Stephens notwithstanding, courts still freely admit
similar transaction evidence in criminal cases, and that was largely the
case during the current survey period, particularly with regard to sex
crimes.33 However, some supreme court justices are beginning to
question the broad use of similar transaction evidence.34 During the
survey period, a court of appeals judge, Judge Barnes, joined in this
criticism. In Roberts v. State,35 the trial court admitted evidence of
defendant's prior guilty plea for the sale of cocaine. In that offense,
defendant flagged down an undercover officer's car and offered to sell the
In the charged offense, defendant also allegedly
agent cocaine.
approached undercover agents in an attempt to sell cocaine. However,
as defendant approached the officers' car, he apparently recognized the
officers and dropped something on the ground. One of the officers
walked directly to that spot and picked up a bag that contained cocaine.
On appeal defendant contended the trial court erroneously admitted
evidence of the prior offense. 6 A majority of the six judge panel
disagreed, concluding that sufficient similarities existed between the two

29. 261 Ga. at 468, 405 S.E.2d at 485.
30. Id. at 469, 405 S.E.2d at 485-86.
31. 261 Ga. at 642, 409 S.E.2d at 651.
32. Id.
33. See Dumas v. State, 239 Ga. App. 210, 214, 521 S.E.2d 108, 112 (1999).
34. See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 48 MERCER L. REV. 323,327 (1996) and Marc
T. Treadwell, Evidence, 49 MERCER L. REV. 149, 154-56 (1997) (discussing Justices
Fletcher's and Sears' frequent criticism of the expanding use of similar transaction
evidence).
35. 241 Ga. App. 259, 526 S.E.2d 597 (1999).
36. Id. at 259-60, 526 S.E.2d at 598-99.
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offenses and that the prior offense was relevant "to the issues being
tried."37
Judge Barnes dissented.3" She began her analysis by emphasizing
the clear statutory prohibition against the admission of extrinsic act
evidence.3 9 As an exception to the rule, trial courts may admit evidence
of extrinsic acts "when a logical connection exists between the separate
offense and the offense for which the defendant is on trial, so that proof
of the separate offense establishes the offense for which the defendant
is on trial."" Thus, although extrinsic act evidence is not admissible
to prove a defendant's bad character, evidence of similar transactions
may be admitted to prove identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind,
and course of conduct. However, in Judge Barnes' opinion, "as the
majority opinion in this appeal illustrates, the exception has swallowed
the rule."4' Judge Barnes criticized the majority for concluding simply
that the prior conviction "'would be most helpful to the jury.'"4 2 That,
Judge Barnes argued, is the precise reason similar transaction evidence
is inadmissible. "This 'he did it once, he must have done it again
reasoning' in fact allows introduction of this evidence solely to show the
defendant has a criminal character."4' Although the State's arguments
on appeal and the trial court's instructions to the jury regarding the
permissible purposes of the similar transaction evidence were not
consistent, Judge Barnes concluded that the evidence was admitted by
the trial court to prove that defendant was the person who dropped the
cocaine and to prove defendant's state of mind.44 However, Judge
Barnes argued that the evidence clearly was not admissible for those
purposes.4 5 The only issue in the case was whether defendant dropped
the cocaine. Given that the officers saw him drop the bag, this was not
a case in which the identity of an alleged perpetrator was not known,
and thus similar transaction evidence was necessary to prove identity.4"
Moreover, defendant's state of mind simply was not an issue at all.47
Finally, even if identity and state of mind were issues, the two crimes

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 259, 526 S.E.2d at
Id. at 263, 526 S.E.2d at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Roberts, 241
Id. at 264, 526 S.E.2d at
Id. at 265, 526 S.E.2d at
Id., 526 S.E.2d at 602.
Id.
Id.

600.
601 (Barnes, J., dissenting).

Ga. App. at 261, 526 S.E.2d at 599).
601.
601-02.
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were not sufficiently similar.48 When similar transaction evidence is
offered to prove identity, a higher degree of similarity is required; the
prosecution must show that the two crimes are so similar that they
evidence a defendant's "'criminal signature."'49 Judge Ruffin agreed
with Judge Barnes' analysis but concluded that the error was harmless.5"
The first step in similar transaction evidence analysis is often
determining whether the extrinsic act evidence is extrinsic to the
charged offense. For example, as noted above, evidence of other
transactions is not extrinsic to the charged offense if it falls within the
res gestae of the charged offense. Also, as reported in the last two
surveys, the supreme court held in Wall v. State5 that evidence of prior
difficulties between a defendant and his victim is not extrinsic and, thus,
is not subject to Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3, which requires the
prosecution to provide a defendant with notice of its intent to tender
extrinsic evidence and the trial court to convene a hearing to establish
whether the prosecution can prove the elements necessary to the
admission of extrinsic act evidence.52 During the current survey period,
the court of appeals, recognizing Wall, summarily disposed of several
appeals contending that prosecutors violated Rule 31.3 by not giving
proper notice of their intent to introduce
evidence of prior difficulties
53
between defendants and their victims.
Character evidence, which is necessarily based on evidence of
transactions other than the transaction at issue, is not considered
similar transaction evidence if a defendant places his character at
issue." In Godbey v. State,55 Judge Eldridge, in a concurring opinion,
took what a majority of a three judge panel termed a dangerous position
with regard to the use of character evidence.56 In Godbey defendant
contended that the prosecution did not comply with the notice requirements of Rule 31." However, the majority concluded that defendant

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 241 Ga. App. at 263, 526 S.E.2d at 600 (Ruffin, J., concurring specially).
51. 269 Ga. 506, 500 S.E.2d 904 (1998).
52. Id. at 509, 500 S.E.2d at 907.
53. Buice v. State, 239 Ga. App. 52, 520 S.E.2d 258 (1999), affd, Buice v. State, 272 Ga.
323, 528 S.E.2d 788 (2000); Hill v. State, 243 Ga. App. 124, 532 S.E.2d 491 (2000); Cox v.
State, 241 Ga. App. 388, 526 S.E.2d 887 (1999).
54. UNIF. SUP. CT. R. 31.3(D).
55. 241 Ga. App. 529, 526 S.E.2d 415 (1999).
56. Id. at 530-31, 526 S.E.2d at 418.
57. Id. at 530, 526 S.E.2d at 417.
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did not preserve his objection to the testimony.5 8 In his concurring
opinion, Judge Eldridge argued that cases of
[c]hild molestation, child abuse, and family violence are uniquely those
cases in which the victim or victims are repeatedly and secretly the
subject of criminal conduct over long periods of time, and the accused
may maintain a public facade of "good character," which can be used
to defend against such charges.59
In such cases, because the defendant "seeks to hide behind the masking
evidence of good character," the requirements of Rule 31.3 are waived.8 °
In short, Judge Eldridge argued that in such cases a defendant puts his
character at issue and, thus, evidence of similar transactions is
admissible notwithstanding Rule 31.3.61
The problem with this
analysis, Judge Eldridge recognized, is that this evidence of bad
character normally would not be admissible until after defendant put up
his evidence of good character. 2
While such evidence may not be introduced during the State's case-inchief in anticipationof a character defense, when a defendant elects to
put his character into evidence, such evidence becomes admissible in
rebuttal. To me, under most circumstances, it is "highly probable" that
the order of the otherwise admissible proof (in the case-in-chief-as
opposed to rebuttal) would not contribute to the jury's verdict.6
In other words, if the prosecution successfully tenders evidence of
extrinsic acts in its case-in-chief even though it had failed to comply
with Rule 31.3 and a defendant, in the presentation of his case, raises
a character defense, then the premature admission of the extrinsic act
evidence is not harmful error.
The majority strongly disagreed.64 Defendant did not state his
intention to assert a character defense prior to trial; even if he had, he
still may have elected not to call character witnesses or any witnesses
at all.65
The danger of allowing the State to anticipate a character defense is
that such an assertion could be made in any criminal case on slender
grounds, as here, or indeed on none at all. Even if the defendant has

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id., 526 S.E.2d at 418.
Id. at 534, 526 S.E.2d at 420 (Eldridge, J., concurring specially).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 535, 526 S.E.2d at 420.
Id.
241 Ga. App. at 531, 526 S.E.2d at 418.
Id.
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listed no witnesses, the defendant himself could still take the stand
and testify to his good character. The State could assert in every
criminal case that the defendant has apotentialcharacter defense. For
that reason, I cannot agree with expanding the exception in USCR
31.3(D) to the State's case-in-chief. If that is done, the exception will
swallow the rule. 6
One of the more difficult issues that may arise in similar transaction
evidence appeals is whether a defendant's acquittal of the similar offense
bars the admission of evidence of that offense at a subsequent trial. 67
In Salcedo v. State,65 the supreme court held that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel bars the admission of extrinsic act evidence concerning an issue resolved in defendant's favor at a prior trial.6 9 During the
current survey period, in Cartwright v. State,7" defendant contended
that the trial court improperly admitted, during his trial for the offenses
of rape, statutory rape, and aggravated sodomy, evidence of a prior
incident in which he allegedly raped and sodomized a fourteen-year-old
girl. A jury acquitted defendant of the prior charge. The trial court
concluded that evidence of the prior offense was admissible because
statutory rape was not an issue at the prior trial.7' The court of
appeals agreed with the trial court's conclusion but not with its
reasoning.72 The court noted that in the trial for the prior offense,
defendant based his defense on a theory of consent.7 3 Although the
court of appeals acknowledged that defendant also contended that the
victim in the charged offense consented to intercourse, the court noted
that when defendant entered his plea he said "I ain't done it," suggesting
a denial of any intercourse with the victim.74 Based on this, the court
apparently concluded that consent was not a defense to the charged
offense. Thus, evidence of the prior offense, because it was distinctively
similar to the charged offense, was admissible to prove that defendant
committed the charged offense.75 "That use of the prior transaction7
evidence was proper and not foreclosed by collateral estoppel." 6

66. Id.
67. For a discussion of the constitutional implications of such evidence, see Dowling v.
United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
68. 258 Ga. 870, 376 S.E.2d 360 (1989).
69. Id. at 871, 376 S.E.2d at 361.
70. 242 Ga. App. 825, 531 S.E.2d 399 (2000).
71. Id. at 825-26, 531 S.E.2d at 400-01.
72. Id. at 827-28, 531 S.E.2d at 401-02.
73. Id. at 827, 531 S.E.2d at 402.
74. Id. at 826-27, 531 S.E.2d at 402.
75. Id. at 827, 531 S.E.2d at 402.
76. Id. at 826-27, 531 S.E.2d at 402.
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Arguably, the court's view of the doctrine of collateral estoppel was
unusually narrow.
Although the court of appeals in Cartwrightheld that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel did not bar the admission of evidence of defendant's
alleged prior rape, it nevertheless reversed defendant's conviction
because the State did not prove the prior offense with admissible
evidence.7" When the victim of the alleged prior rape refused to testify,
the trial court, relying on the res gestae doctrine, allowed a police officer
to testify about the victim's statement to him concerning the alleged
rape."8 However, the court of appeals noted that the statement was
given to the police officer sometime after the alleged rape, that the
victim had spoken with her parents and another officer before giving her
statement, and that the victim was "giggling" when she gave the
statement.7 9 Clearly, the victim's statement was not part of the res
gestae; thus, the trial court erred when it admitted the police officer's
account of that statement.8 0 Because the State offered no admissible
evidence to prove the prior offense, the court reversed defendant's
conviction. 1
The supreme court addressed the level of proof necessary to establish
the fact of the similar transaction in Hudson v. State. 2 In Hudson the
prosecution, to prove the similar transaction, tendered certified copies of
the indictment for the prior offense, defendant's guilty plea, and the
testimony of two police officers involved in the investigation of the prior
offense. However, the trial court ruled that the police officers' testimony
was inadmissible hearsay. Thus, certified copies of documents were the
only evidence of the prior offense. Nevertheless, the jury convicted
defendant.8 3 On appeal the supreme court noted that before evidence
of an alleged similar transaction is admissible, the prosecution must
prove sufficient similarities between the prior offense and the charged
offense. 4 The court continued stating that it has frequently been held
that certified copies of the prior convictions alone are not sufficient to
prove those similarities.8 5 Thus, the prosecution failed to meet its
burden of showing the requisite similarities between the prior offense

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 830, 531 S.E.2d at 403-04.
Id. at 826, 531 S.E.2d at 401.
Id. at 828, 531 S.E.2d at 402-03.
Id. at 828, 531 S.E.2d at 403.
Id. at 830, 531 S.E.2d at 404.
271 Ga. 477, 521 S.E.2d 810 (1999).
Id. at 479, 521 S.E.2d at 812.
Id.
Id.
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and the charged offense. However, the court concluded this error was
harmless. 6
When the supreme court listed the long line of authority holding that
certified copies of prior convictions are not alone sufficient to prove the
requisite similarities between a prior offense and the charged offense,"
it noted the court of appeals decision in Adams v.State."8 In Adams a
plurality held that in child sexual abuse cases, a certified copy of a prior
conviction for a sex crime against a child may, with no other evidence,
be enough to prove that the prior crime is sufficiently similar to the
charged offense. 9 The supreme court noted that it "pass[ed] no
judgment on the validity" of Adams.9" The court of appeals has no
reservations about Adams' validity. During the survey period, the court
in Lee v. State"' affirmed defendant's conviction for statutory rape and
relied on Adams to support its conclusion that a certified copy of
defendant's prior child abuse conviction was, by itself, sufficient to prove
that defendant committed the offense and that it bore sufficient
similarities to the charged offense to be admissible as a similar
transaction.92 It would seem that, sooner or later, the supreme court
will have to pass judgment on the issue of whether the State can, in a
child abuse case, prove a prior offense against a child simply by relying
on certified copies of the conviction for the prior offense.
The court of appeals addressed the nature of the evidence that can be
used to establish a similar transaction in Dixon v. State.93 In Dixon the
trial court admitted defendant's "Alford" plea to a prior offense as
evidence that defendant committed that offense.94 An Alford plea,
which takes its name from the United States Supreme Court's decision
in North Carolina v. Alford,9 allows a defendant to "'voluntarily,
knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison
sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in
the acts constituting the crime.'"96 Defendant contended this was error,
arguing that an Alford plea was similar to a plea of nolo contendere.97

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 481, 521 S.E.2d at 813.
Id. at 479-80, 521 S.E.2d at 812-13.
208 Ga. App. 29, 430 S.E.2d 35 (1993).
271 Ga. App. at 480, 521 S.E.2d at 813.
Id. n.5.
241 Ga. App. 182, 525 S.E.2d 426 (1999).
Id. at 183-84, 525 S.E.2d at 429.
240 Ga. App. 644, 524 S.E.2d 734 (1999).
Id. at 644-45, 524 S.E.2d at 735.
400 U.S. 25 (1970).
240 Ga. App. at 645, 524 S.E.2d at 735 (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 37).

97. Id.
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The court of appeals acknowledged that a plea of nolo contendere, by
statute, cannot be used "'as an admission of guilt or otherwise or for any
purpose."'9 However, the court noted a critical procedural distinction
between an Alford plea and a plea of nolo contendere: When a party
seeks to enter an Alford plea, the court must find that a factual basis
exists for the guilty plea.9" An Alford plea is, in fact, a guilty plea
while a nolo contendere plea does not conclusively establish a defendant's guilt. °° Therefore, the trial court properly admitted defendant's
Alford plea as part of the proof that he committed the prior 'offense.' 1
The scope of admissible extrinsic act evidence is generally narrower in
civil cases than in criminal cases. At first glance this may seem odd
because it would seem that courts should be more reluctant to admit
highly prejudicial extrinsic act evidence in criminal cases, in which
freedom and occasionally life are at stake. However, a logical basis
exists for this disparate treatment. Civil cases rarely involve issues of
intent, motive,, scheme, or other issues relevant in cases involving
criminal misconduct. Rather, civil cases typically involve unintentional
conduct, such as negligence, and regardless of the actor's intent, liability
is created. In such cases, the fact that a defendant was, for example,
negligent on a prior occasion is simply not probative of whether he was
negligent on another occasion. The effect of such evidence is simply to
suggest that because defendant was negligent before, he is more likely
to be negligent again. This, of course, is the very reason that extrinsic
act evidence is not admissible.0 2
However, as illustrated by several cases decided during the survey
period, extrinsic act evidence is admissible in civil cases if it is relevant
to a legitimate issue. In Woodall v. Rivermont Apartments, L.P, the
court of appeals held that evidence of prior violent crimes occurring in
the vicinity of defendants' apartment complex was admissible to prove
that an attack on plaintiff at the apartment complex was foreseeable. 0 4 This holding is fairly straightforward. The prior violent
crimes put defendants on notice that a criminal attack was foreseeable.
Because plaintiff, to prove his case that defendants were liable for the
criminal attack on him, had to show that the attack was foreseeable,
evidence of the prior attacks was admissible. The court then turned to

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 17-7-95(c) (1997)).
Id., 524 S.E.2d at 736.
Id. at 646, 524 S.E.2d at 736.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2 (1995).
239 Ga. App. 36, 520 S.E.2d 741 (1999).
Id. at 40-41, 520 S.E.2d at 745.

2000]

EVIDENCE

275

the more difficult question of whether evidence of twenty separate
nonviolent property crimes was admissible.'0 5 The trial court examined each crime separately and concluded that none was sufficiently
similar to the attack on plaintiff to make it relevant to the issue of
foreseeability. 10 6 The court of appeals agreed that none of the property
crimes, standing alone, was relevant to prove that the criminal attack
on plaintiff was foreseeable to defendants." 7 However, the court then
addressed an issue of first impression-"whether evidence of a crime
that, standing alone, would not raise an issue of foreseeability may be
relevant when considered in light of other evidence." 8 The court
noted that the apartment complex was adjacent to an area with a high
incidence of violent crimes and that defendants were concerned about
security issues relating to the increase in crime at the apartment
complex.'0 9 The court then concluded that evidence of an increase in
property crimes, although not similar to the attack on plaintiff, was
relevant to the question of whether defendants should have foreseen a
risk of personal injury to their tenants from a criminal attack."0
The court of appeals also reaffirmed that in product liability actions
evidence of similar manufacturing defects may be admissible to prove
the existence of a defect, notice or prior knowledge of the defect,
causation, or conduct warranting punitive damages."' Similarly, in
Mills v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,"2 the court of appeals held that
evidence of prior failures of a railroad crossing signal and gate was
admissible to prove defendant's notice of the malfunctioning crossing
equipment."'
On the other hand, the court of appeals decision in Taylor v. RaceTrac
Petroleum, Inc."4 demonstrates that the extrinsic act evidence must
be relevant to a legitimate issue. In Taylor plaintiffs contended that
defendant was liable for the wrongful death of their son because
defendant illegally sold alcohol to the driver of a car in which their son
was a passenger. Their son was killed when the drunken driver wrecked
the car. On appeal plaintiffs contended the trial court erroneously

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
(1999).
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 38, 520 S.E.2d at 743.
Id. at 37, 520 S.E.2d at 743.
Id. at 39, 520 S.E.2d at 744.
Id.
Id. at 40-41, 520 S.E.2d at 745.
Id. at 40, 520 S.E.2d at 745.
Crosby v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 240 Ga. App. 857, 860, 524 S.E.2d 313, 318
242 Ga. App. 324, 526 S.E.2d 585 (1999).
Id. at 324, 526 S.E.2d at 586-87.
238 Ga. App. 761, 519 S.E.2d 282 (1999).
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admitted evidence of their son's prior drug and alcohol use, his reckless
driving, and other conduct by their son on other occasions. Defendant
contended that this evidence was relevant to the issue of damages
because such conduct would affect the son's life expectancy." 5 The
court of appeals agreed with plaintiffs and reversed the judgment
entered in defendant's favor.'16 The court acknowledged that evidence
of long-term drug or alcohol abuse may affect life expectancy and, thus,
can be admissible on the issue of damages in a wrongful death action. 1 7 However, the "anecdotal evidence" tendered by defendant was
inadequate to prove any effect on life expectancy."' Moreover, even
if the evidence was relevant to the issue of damages, the potential
prejudice of the evidence on the issue of liability required the bifurcation
of the trial so that the jury, when it decided the issue of liability, would
not be affected by harmful evidence relevant only to the issue of
damages."'
B.

Miscellaneous Relevancy Issues
In Vaughn v. Protective Insurance Co.,2' the trial court granted
defendants' motion in limine to prohibit plaintiff and his counsel from
referring to the fact that defendants' counsel had employed plaintiff's
expert in other cases. At the subsequent trial, defendants attacked the
expert's credibility. On appeal plaintiff contended that his attorney, in
an effort to bolster the expert's credibility, should have been allowed to
establish that defendants' attorney had employed the expert in twelve
to fifteen similar cases.' 2' The court of appeals disagreed.'22 The
fact that the expert had been employed by defendants' counsel was not
relevant to the question of whether the expert was competent and
qualified.'23 Simply because defendants' attorney hired the expert in
other cases did not raise the inference that the attorney necessarily
thought the expert was a competent expert witness. 24 As an advocate,
the attorney no doubt was more interested in finding an expert willing
to offer an opinion favorable to his clients than finding a competent or
qualified expert.
115.
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Id. at 761-62, 519 S.E.2d at 283-84.
Id. at 766, 519 S.E.2d at 286.
Id. at 762, 519 S.E.2d at 284.
Id.
Id. at 763, 519 S.E.2d at 285.
243 Ga. App. 79, 532 S.E.2d 159 (2000).
Id. at 83-84, 532 S.E.2d at 163-64.
Id. at 84, 532 S.E.2d at 164.
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PRIVILEGES

In Price v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,125 a case
discussed in last year's survey, the court of appeals held that the
psychiatric-patient privilege is waived if a party fails to object timely to
a request for the production of a psychiatrist's records pursuant to
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-34(c)(1),
127

126

Georgia's provision for obtaining

discovery from nonparties.
The full court of appeals returned to this
issue during the survey period in Hopson v. Kennestone Hospital,
Inc. 121 In Hopson the hospital sued plaintiff for nonpayment of a bill.
Plaintiff counterclaimed, contending that the hospital improperly
produced her psychiatric records in prior litigation. The hospital
responded that because plaintiff failed to object timely to the production
of those records in the prior litigation, she waived
the privilege. 129 The
130
Price.
overruled
and
disagreed
court of appeals
The court of appeals reasoned that O.C.G.A. section 9-11-34(c)(1) only
establishes that a party may obtain discovery of documents that are
within the scope of discovery defined by O.C.G.A. section 9-11-26(b),' 3'
which provides that parties may discover only matter that is not
privileged.13 Thus, a request for the production of documents under
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-34(c) constitutes only a request that a party
produce nonprivileged records. 133 Because privileged psychiatricpatient communications are not within the scope of the request, there is
no burden on the patient to object to the request and assert the
privilege. By not objecting to the request, plaintiff waived only whatever
objection34she may have had to nonprivileged material in her medical
records. 1

The court of appeals decision, although laudable in its effort to protect
psychiatric-patient communications, is problematic. Although psychiatric-patient communications are afforded greater protection than general
doctor-patient communications, all such communications are privileged.
Therefore, any request for the production of medical records would
125. 235 Ga. App. 792, 510 S.E.2d 582 (1998), overruled by Hopson v. Kennestone
Hosp., Inc., 241 Ga. App. 829, 526 S.E.2d 622 (1999).
126. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-34(c)(1) (Supp. 2000).
127. 235 Ga. App. at 793-94, 510 S.E.2d at 584.
128. 241 Ga. App. 829, 526 S.E.2d 622 (1999).
129. Id. at 829-30, 526 S.E.2d at 624.
130. Id. at 830, 526 S.E.2d at 624.
131. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(b) (1993).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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encompass privileged communications even if they did not contain
psychiatric-patient communications.
Thus, pursuant to Hopson, a
hospital or doctor should not produce any records containing privileged
communications, whether those communications are between a
psychiatrist and a patient or between other medical providers and
patients. It is questionable whether this is the intent of the court of
appeals holding in Hopson. It would seem more likely that the court
intended to provide special protection for the absolute privilege of
psychiatric-patient communications.
VI.

A.

WITNESSES

Impeachment Generally

Two cases decided during the survey period illustrate the critical,
although often unrecognized, distinction between impeaching a witness'
general credibility or character and impeaching specific testimony. In
5
Thrasher v. State"3
and Vehaun v. State,"' defendants contended
that prosecutors improperly impeached their character by asking them
about, respectively, a prior conviction for selling cocaine and flight to
avoid a rape prosecution. In Thrasher defendant testified that he did
not "fool with" cocaine." 7 In Vehaun defendant testified that he fled
to another state simply because of a jealous husband."' In both cases,
the court of appeals held that prosecutors were allowed to impeach
defendants with evidence of their prior misconduct-evidence that
otherwise would be inadmissible evidence of bad character-because that
evidence disproved their specific testimony."9 As the court noted in
Thrasher, "when a defendant testifies and falsely denies past criminal
conduct or misdeeds, the State may introduce evidence that reflects
negatively on the defendant's character insofar as that evidence 'proves
the falsity of specific testimony of the defendant.""'4
Therefore,
evidence that is inadmissible to impeach a defendant's general credibility
or character may be admissible to impeach that defendant's specific
testimony.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

243 Ga. App. 702, 534 S.E.2d 439 (2000).
244 Ga. App. 136, 534 S.E.2d 873 (2000).
243 Ga. App. at 702, 534 S.E.2d at 439.
244 Ga. App. at 137, 534 S.E.2d at 874.
243 Ga. App. at 703, 534 S.E.2d at 440; 244 Ga. App. at 137, 534 S.E.2d at 874.
Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 257 Ga. 753, 759, 363 S.E.2d 529, 534 (1988)).
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Impeachment By PriorInconsistent Statement

The court of appeals decision in Fulton-Fritchlee v. Douglas'
illustrates an important distinction between the use of a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment and the use of a prior inconsistent
statement for substantive purposes. In Fulton-Fritchleedefendant used
plaintiff's prior medical records, without first showing the records to
plaintiff's counsel, to impeach plaintiff's testimony. On appeal plaintiff
14 3
The court of appeals disagreed.
contended that this was error.'
Because the records were used to impeach plaintiff's testimony, the
procedure for using the records is prescribed by O.C.G.A. section 24-983,'" which requires a party to show or read to a witness the alleged
contradictory statement.'45 The statute does not require that the
written statement first be shown to opposing counsel, even when the
witness is the opposing party. However, if defendant wanted to
introduce the documents into evidence, presumably meaning that they
would be used for substantive purposes, then the documents would be
treated as any other evidence offered for substantive purposes.
Also during the survey period, the court of appeals reaffirmed that
when a witness merely states that she does not remember a fact, as
opposed to denying a fact, then she cannot be impeached with prior
statements which suggest that plaintiff did, at least at one time, recall
what she now claims she cannot remember. 146 Rather, the appropriate
response is to refresh the recollection of plaintiff with the prior

statement. 147
C.

Refreshing Recollection

There is some confusion in Georgia law with regard to the use of a
writing not prepared by a witness to refresh the witness' recollection.
In Woods v. State,148 a case discussed in a previous survey, the supreme court held that a witness' recollection could be refreshed by any

141. 240 Ga. App. 413, 523 S.E.2d 349 (1999).
142. Id. at 414, 523 S.E.2d at 351.
143. Id. at 415, 523 S.E.2d at 351.
144. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-83 (1995).
145. 240 Ga. App. at 414, 523 S.E.2d at 351.
146. Bischoffv. Payne, 239 Ga. App. 824, 826, 522 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1999).
147. Id. at 825, 522 S.E.2d at 258. In Bischoff the court of appeals also held that
defendant properly used plaintiffs complaint in a prior lawsuit to impeach her testimony
regarding the extent of the injuries she suffered in a prior collision. Id. at 826, 522 S.E.2d
at 259.
148. 269 Ga. 60, 495 S.E.2d 282 (1998).
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writing, whether or not the writing was prepared by the witness "so long
as the witness testifies from personal recollection."14 9 Thus, in Woods
the supreme court held that the trial court erroneously refused to allow
defendant to show a police officer's report to a witness to refresh his
recollection. 50
During the current survey period, the court of appeals held in
McEntyre v. McCrae15' that the trial court properly barred defendant
from using a letter prepared by plaintiff's employer to refresh plaintiff's
recollection after plaintiff apparently testified that she had not been
asked for permission to release her employment records. The letter
stated that the employer had asked the employee three times and that
she had refused to give her consent to the release of the records.5 2
The court of appeals simply held that a party cannot use a document to
refresh a witness' recollection when that document was not prepared by
the witness, or at her direction, or in her presence.' 53
The holding in McEntyre is inconsistent with the holding in Woods
with regard to refreshing recollection. However, it would seem that the
situation in McEntyre was similar to that in Woods because defendant
was not really attempting to refresh the plaintiff's recollection but rather
wanted to use the third party writing to impeach the witness. Thus, as
in Woods, any error was harmless.
D.

Sequestration

The supreme court's decision in Jones v. State... is a good illustration of the proper application of the rule of sequestration. In Jones a
witness telephoned defendant's attorney during defendant's trial for
murder. The witness told the attorney that the State was threatening
to imprison him to force him to testify falsely. The next day, defendant's
counsel informed the court of this conversation.
The trial judge
concluded that this conversation was a violation of the rule of sequestration and instructed jurors that they could consider this violation in

149. Id. at 62, 495 S.E.2d at 285.
150. Id. at 63, 495 S.E.2d at 285. However, the supreme court went on to hold that the
error was harmless because defendant's true goal was not to refresh the witness'
recollection but rather to impeach the witness. Id. In other words, the court concluded
that defendant was attempting to impeach the witness with a writing he did not prepare
and thus the trial court, albeit for the wrong reason, properly barred defendant from using
the document in his examination of the witness.
151. 240 Ga. App. 148, 522 S.E.2d 731 (1999).
152. Id. at 149, 522 S.E.2d at 733.
153. Id.
154. 271 Ga. 516, 520 S.E.2d 454 (1999).
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determining credibility of the witness. 5 ' The supreme court held that
this was an error.'56 The court noted that the rule of sequestration
does not prohibit an attorney from talking with a witness.157 Rather,
the rule prohibits attorneys and parties from talking jointly with
witnesses or informing a witness of prior testimony.'58 Therefore, the
supreme court concluded the trial court improperly instructed the jury
that a violation of the rule had occurred and this could be considered in
assessing the witness' credibility.'59
VII.

A.

OPINION TESTIMONY

Subject Matter of Expert Testimony

In almost every survey article written by the author since 1988, the
author has attempted to analyze the numerous cases in which the courts
have struggled with the question of whether expert testimony is
admissible to prove or disprove that a child was sexually abused.
Because this struggle emanated from two apparently conflicting supreme
court decisions, State v. Butler 60 and Allison v. State,'6' the author
has referred to this struggle as the Butler/Allison debate. In the 1992
survey, the author optimistically reported that the Butler/Allison debate
62
had been resolved by the supreme court's decision in Harris v. State.
That report was dreadfully premature as evidenced again by two
decisions during the current survey period.
In Atkins v. State,113 a six judge panel of the court of appeals
addressed defendant's contention that a pediatrician improperly testified
that the victim's medical history was consistent with the medical history
she would expect from a victim of molestation. 64 The court acknowledged the apparent contradiction between Butler and Allison.'65 In
Butler the supreme court "established a very broad view regarding the
admissibility of a pediatrician's opinion that a child had actually been
66
abused based on a physical examination and medical history."
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Id. at 518, 520 S.E.2d at 456.
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Id.
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256 Ga. 448, 349 S.E.2d 684 (1986).
256 Ga. 851, 353 S.E.2d 805 (1987).
261 Ga. 386, 405 S.E.2d 482 (1991).
243 Ga. App. 489, 533 S.E.2d 152 (2000).
Id. at 491, 533 S.E.2d at 154.
Id. at 492-93, 533 S.E.2d at 156.
Id. at 493, 533 S.E.2d at 155.
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However, in Allison the supreme court "appeared to restrict the broad
admissibility of an expert's conclusion that molestation actually
occurred."167 Relying on Allison, the court in Atkins stated that an
expert cannot testify that abuse actually took place if there is no
tangible physical evidence of the abuse, but the expert can testify that
the victim's symptoms are consistent with a determination that the
victim is suffering from an abuse syndrome. 168 Then in Harris, the
supreme court, although not expressly overruling Butler, held that a
pediatrician may not testify that an act of abuse actually occurred even
if the testimony is based upon a physical examination. 69 However,
relying on the dissenting opinions in Harris,the court of appeals noted
that an expert may testify that findings are consistent with an act of
molestation. 70 Thus, because the pediatrician in Atkins only testified
that her findings were consistent with an act of abuse, the admission of
her testimony was not error.' 7'
In an opinion reflecting exasperation over the number of appeals
spawned by the Butler/Allison debate, the court of appeals in Odom v.
State"72
' seemed to send a message to defense lawyers and prosecutors.
Since the State is required to prove its case, expert opinion testimony
often becomes necessary, especially in instances of the abuse of very
young children-as in this case. And we have seen these "improper
opinion testimony" claims of error again and again on appeal, because
(1) the inconsistency of appellate consensus over what constitutes
improper opinion testimony has made the raising of such claims worth
a try in almost every case, regardless of the merits of the claims; and
(2) the State's prosecutors ask open-ended questions of their experts
that inevitably elicit improper opinion testimony regarding either the
ultimate issue or the credibility of the victim. In affirming Odom's
conviction, we have an opportunity to review both of these aspects: the
utterly meritless claim raised on the chance that it might be taken
seriously, and the merited claim of error occurring because of a
prosecutor's question that inevitably called for improper opinion
testimony.173
The court of appeals then examined the several instances of expert
testimony that defendant claimed constituted an opinion on the ultimate

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id., 533 S.E.2d at 156.
Id. at 494, 533 S.E.2d at 156.
261 Ga. at 387, 405 S.E.2d at 483.
243 Ga. App. at 494, 533 S.E.2d at 156.
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issue. First, defendant claimed that one expert improperly testified that
the victim was referred to her for treatment of "'[ailleged child sexual
abuse and post traumatic stress disorder.""74 Defendant contended
that this improperly bolstered the child's testimony because the expert
would not have been treating the child for child sexual abuse unless she
believed the child.' 75 This argument irked the court of appeals because
it demonstrated "how far-fetched some of these 'improper expert
testimony' claims can be."' 76 Clearly, the expert's testimony did not
express an opinion regarding the merits of the referral.
Next, defendant contended that an expert's testimony that the threeyear-old victim's description of what happened and the extent of his
knowledge about matters that normally would not be known to a three
year-old, "was most consistent with a history of sex abuse."' 77 Defendant argued that this was a direct opinion from the expert that the
victim had been sexually abused. 7 ' The court of appeals strongly
disagreed. 7 9 Rather, the expert simply testified that the findings of
her physical examination and her evaluation of the victim's behavior
were consistent with sexual abuse. 8 ° This opinion, the court concluded, was based on matters "beyond the ken of the average juror" and,
It was still left to the jury
thus, was a permissible expert opinion.'
to decide whether the victim had been molested.8 2
However, another expert testified that, in his opinion, the child had
been sexually abused.' 83 The trial court sustained defendant's objection to this testimony and, on appeal, the court of appeals agreed that
this testimony constituted improper opinion testimony on the ultimate
issue."' 4 Moreover, the court of appeals pinned the blame for the
testimony on the prosecutor's open-ended question.'
As long as such errors are made by prosecutors who will not learn the
distinctions discussed supra and thus cannot prepare their experts for
such distinctions, "improper opinion testimony" claims-with and
without merit-will be raised again and again on appeal of sexual

174. Id. at 229, 531 S.E.2d at 209.
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abuse convictions. And reversals (in my view, warranted and
unwarranted because of the lack of appellate consensus) will be
forthcoming, thereby putting the child/victim through the trauma of
retrial."'8
However, this improper question did not require reversal of defendant's conviction because the trial court directed the jury to disregard
the improper testimony, because defendant did not move for a mistrial,
and because the evidence against defendant was overwhelming." 7
The court of appeals decision in Jenkins v. State s8 did not directly
involve the Butler/Allison issue of whether an expert can testify that a
child has been the victim of abuse. However, it did concern the basic
issue involved in the Butler/Allison debate-whether an expert has
impermissibly testified on the ultimate issue. In Jenkins several police
officers testified that, in their opinion and based on the amount of crack
cocaine found in defendant's possession, defendant intended to distribute
crack cocaine rather than simply keep it for personal use. Defendant,
who was charged with intent to distribute cocaine, contended that this
opinion testimony was inadmissible because it went to the ultimate issue
in the case." 9 The court of appeals disagreed."9 The court noted
that expert testimony on the ultimate issue is admissible if the
"conclusion of the expert is one beyond the ken of the average layman."' Because the average layman would not necessarily know how
much cocaine someone would generally possess for personal use or how
much cocaine would evidence an intent to distribute, the court held that
the trial court properly allowed the officers to testify that defendant
intended to distribute cocaine.' 9 2
The question of whether an expert can testify with regard to the
reliability of eyewitness testimony was raised again during the survey
period. As reported in a previous survey, the supreme court affirmed a
trial court's refusal to permit defendant's expert witness to testify about
potential inaccuracies in eyewitness identification.' 9' In Norris v.
State,' the supreme court reasoned that a witness' credibility is

186. Id., 531 S.E.2d at 210-11.
187. Id. at 231, 531 S.E.2d at 211.
188. 240 Ga. App. 102, 522 S.E.2d 678 (1999).
189. Id. at 104-05, 522 S.E.2d at 680.
190. Id. at 104, 522 S.E.2d at 680.
191. Id. (quoting Davis v. State, 200 Ga. App. 44, 46, 406 S.E.2d 555, 557 (1991)).
192. Id. at 105, 522 S.E.2d at 681.
193. Norris v. State, 258 Ga. 889, 890, 376 S.E.2d 653, 654 (1989), overruled in part by
Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 254, 526 S.E.2d 549 (2000).
194. 258 Ga. 889, 376 S.E.2d 653 (1989).
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within the exclusive province of the jury.' 95 While an eyewitness may
be impeached by cross examination, the credibility of the eyewitness may
not be disparaged by another witness, even an expert witness.'9
During the current survey period, the supreme court qualified this
holding. In Johnson v. State, 97 defendant contended that the trial
court improperly granted the State's motion in limine prohibiting him
from relying on expert testimony attacking the reliability of eyewitness
identification. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed defendant's
conviction. 9 '
The supreme court granted certiorari to consider
whether a defendant's constitutional rights require vesting trial courts
with the discretion to admit appropriate expert testimony regarding the
reliability of eyewitness identifications.' 99 The court began its lengthy
examination of the treatment of this issue by courts throughout the
country by noting that its decision in Norris had been interpreted as an
absolute bar to the admission of expert testimony on the reliability of
eyewitness identifications."'
The court acknowledged that only a
minority of jurisdictions adhered to such an absolute ban.2 ' However,
the court refused to join what defendant contended was the "modern
trend," which required a trial court to admit such expert testimony when
the prosecution's case depends entirely upon eyewitness identification.20 2 After considering the authorities and the merits of both
positions, the court adopted a middle approach: Expert testimony on the
reliability of eyewitness identifications should not be absolutely
prohibited, but neither should it necessarily be admitted simply because
the State's case is built entirely on eyewitness identification. °3
Rather, trial courts are vested with the discretion to decide, based on the
facts of the case before them, whether to admit such evidence.0 4
Where eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of
the state's case and there is no substantial corroboration of that
identification by other evidence, trial courts may not exclude expert
testimony without carefully weighing whether the evidence would
assist the jury in assessing the reliability of eyewitness testimony and
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whether expert eyewitness testimony is the only effective way to reveal
any weakness in an eyewitness identification.0 5
Finally, the court of appeals reaffirmed during the survey period that
the reliability of the Abuscreen Ontrak Test, a test performed on urine
samples to reveal marijuana use, has not been sufficiently recognized to
allow a trial court to take judicial notice that the reliability of the6
20
Ontrack system has been established with verifiable certainty.
Thus, pursuant to Harper v. State,217 the party relying on the Ontrack
system results must adduce evidence establishing the reliability of the
test.
B.

Expert Witnesses

The court of appeals rendered several decisions during this survey
period that clarify some of the finer points regarding expert witnesses.
First, the mere fact that an expert is not licensed in a particular field
does not mean that he cannot be qualified as an expert in that field.20 8
Second, an expert witness can base his opinion on facts known to him
personally or on facts of which he has been made aware by a hypothetical question. 2 9 However, if his opinion is based solely on inadmissible
hearsay, then his opinion is inadmissible.210
With regard to the use of hypothetical questions, the court of appeals
211
decision in Cornelius v. Macon-Bibb County Hospital Authority
makes clear that the proper parameters of hypothetical questions vary
depending on whether the expert is a party. In Cornelius the trial court
sustained defendant's objection to plaintiff's hypothetical question posed
to defendant, who was a doctor, on the grounds that facts stated in the
hypothetical question were not in evidence. 212 This,- the court of
appeals held, was error.21 3 While it is generally true that a hypotheti-

205. Id. at 257, 526 S.E.2d at 552-53.
206. Bowen v. State, 242 Ga. App. 631, 633, 531 S.E.2d 104, 106 (2000); see also
Hubbard v. State, 207 Ga. App. 703, 704, 429 S.E.2d 123, 124 (1993); Marc T. Treadwell,
Evidence, 45 MERCER L. REV. 229, 243 (1993).
207. 249 Ga. 519, 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982).
208. Dayouv v. Yates-Astro Termite Pest Control Co., 239 Ga. App. 578, 580, 521
S.E.2d 600, 602 (1999).
209. In re MCJ, 242 Ga. App. 852, 857, 531 S.E.2d 404, 408 (2000).
210. Carlson v. State, 240 Ga. App. 589, 590, 524 S.E.2d 283, 285-86 (1999). The issue
of whether and to what extent an expert may base his opinion on hearsay has been a
problematic one in Georgia. See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 46 MERCER L. REV.
233, 250-52 (1994).
211. 243 Ga. App. 480, 533 S.E.2d 420 (2000).
212. Id. at 483, 533 S.E.2d at 424.
213. Id.
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cal question posed to an expert witness must be based on facts in
evidence, this requirement is not applicable if the witness "'is a
defendant in the case and not
merely an expert testifying as to the
214
proper standard of conduct.'
VIII.
A.

HEARSAY

Definition of Hearsay

If asked the definition of hearsay, most Georgia lawyers almost
certainly would say that hearsay is an out of court statement offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. In fact, this is the
definition of hearsay used most frequently by Georgia courts.215
However, this is not Georgia's statutory definition of hearsay. The
statute defines hearsay as "that which does not derive its value solely
from the credit of the witness but rests mainly on the veracity and
competency of other persons."216 Thus, a witness' out of court statement is hearsay under the common definition of hearsay, but it would
not be hearsay under the statutory definition because the statement does
not rest on the "veracity and competency" of someone other than the
witness.
For the first time since the author has been reviewing Georgia
evidence decisions, a Georgia appellate court used the statutory
definition of hearsay to conclude that a statement was not hearsay,
notwithstanding the fact that it was hearsay under the common
definition. In Bowers v. State,217 defendant contended the trial court
erred when it allowed a witness to testify that she warned the victim not
to report an assault by the victim's father because the father could be
imprisoned.
Defendant contended that this was an out of court
statement by the witness and therefore was hearsay."' The court of
appeals disagreed. 219 Relying on the statutory definition of hearsay,
the court concluded that because the statement was made by the
witness, it was not dependent upon the competency and veracity of
others and, therefore, was not hearsay.2

214.
(1980)).
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. (quoting Cambron v. Canal Ins. Co., 246 Ga. 147, 150, 269 S.E.2d 426, 429
See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 44 MERCER L. REV. 213, 235-36 (1992).
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1 (1995).
241 Ga. App. 122, 526 S.E.2d 163 (1999).
Id. at 124, 526 S.E.2d at 165-66.
Id. at 124, 526 S.E.2d at 165.
Id., 526 S.E.2d at 165-66.
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In another case decided during this survey period, Sturkey v.
State,221 the supreme court apparently used a hybrid definition of
hearsay. The court held that evidence of a victim's threat two weeks
before the victim's death was not hearsay because it did not depend on
the victim's credibility and was not offered to prove the truth of the
victim's statement.222
B.

ConstitutionalImplications of Hearsay

In criminal cases, the use of hearsay evidence frequently raises the
issue of whether the evidence violates the confrontation clause of the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Case law has
considerably modified the constitutional principles governing this conflict
over the past several years. The author has attempted to chronicle these
modifications in previous Georgia and Eleventh Circuit survey articles; 221 that detailed discussion will not be repeated here.
During the current survey period, the court of appeals addressed the
constitutional limitations on the use of hearsay evidence in the context
of alleged Bruton violations. In Bruton v. United States,224 the Supreme Court held that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation is violated when codefendants are tried jointly, the prior
statement of one codefendant is used to implicate the other codefendant,
and the codefendant who made the statement does not testify at
trial. 225 However, such an out of court statement implicating a
codefendant may be admissible if the statement falls within a firmly
7
228
In York v. State,22
rooted exception to the rule against hearsay.
the court held that the res gestae exception to the rule against hearsay
is such a firmly rooted exception and, thus, permits the introduction of
a statement notwithstanding the fact it violates Bruton.228
C.

The Necessity Exception

The author has in previous surveys marveled at the evolution of
Georgia's necessity exception to the rule against hearsay. Regardless of
one's opinion on the wisdom of greatly expanding the use of hearsay
testimony primarily in criminal cases, the necessity exception is now

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

271 Ga. 572, 522 S.E.2d 463 (1999).
Id. at 573, 522 S.E.2d at 465.
See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 44 MERCER L. REv. 1209, 1225-29 (1993).
391 U.S. 123 (1968).
Id. at 137.
Id. at 129 n.3.
242 Ga. App. 281, 528 S.E.2d 823 (2000).
Id. at 286, 528 S.E.2d at 831.
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firmly ensconced, and perhaps it is time to stop marveling at the
amazingly rapid development of the necessity exception and simply
report on the appellate courts' continued refinement of the exception.
In last year's survey, the author reported that the supreme court, in
Chapel v. State,229 modified the two-pronged test for the admission of
evidence under the necessity exception. When proving the first prong of
the test, the unavailability of the declarant, the court in Chapel held
that the party offering the evidence must also show that "the statement
is relevant to a material fact and that the evidence is more probative on
that material fact than other evidence that may be procured and
offered."2 3 ° Based on cases decided during the current survey period,
it does not appear that the new Chapel prong to the necessity exception
test will have much practical effect on the admission of necessary
hearsay evidence.2"'
Most necessity exception cases involve statements by a deceased victim
to friends, relatives, and coworkers. Given the unavailability of the
declarant, these cases typically raise the issue of whether the hearsay
evidence satisfies the second prong of the necessity exception
test-whether the circumstances of the statement provide "particularized
For example, in Abraha v.
guarantees of trustworthiness."232
State,23 the victim made statements incriminating defendant to
witnesses who were her good friends and confidants.3 4 The court
noted that the statements were consistent with the physical evidence
and that the victim had no motive to fabricate the statements to her
close friends. 3 5 This, the court concluded, was sufficient to establish
the trustworthiness of the victim's statements.3 6
On the other hand, in McWilliams v. State,23' the supreme court
reversed defendant's conviction because the prosecution failed to
establish that the victim's statements to her sister were sufficiently
In McWilliams the prosecution apparently only
trustworthy. 23 8
established the sibling relationship. While the court acknowledged that
"'uncontradicted statements made to one in whom the deceased
declarant placed great confidence and to whom she turned for help with

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

270 Ga. 151, 510 S.E.2d 802 (1998).
Id. at 155, 510 S.E.2d at 807.
See, e.g., Holsey v. State, 271 Ga. 856, 862, 524 S.E.2d 473, 479 (1999).
Adame v. State, 244 Ga. App. 257, 534 S.E.2d 817 (2000).
271 Ga. 309, 518 S.E.2d 894 (1999).
Id. at 313, 518 S.E.2d at 898.
Id. at 313-14, 518 S.E.2d at 898.
Id.
271 Ga. 655, 521 S.E.2d 824 (1999).
Id. at 656, 521 S.E.2d at 826.
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her problems are admissible under the necessity exception,' ' 239 the

court found no evidence that the victim and her sister had such a
relationship.24 ° Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's conviction.24 '
In Downs v. State,242 the declarant was a victim of battery who
refused to testify based on spousal privilege. Her statements incriminating the defendant were made to her daughter, but the daughter testified
that her relationship with her mother had not always been close and
that the statements were not made until the preliminary hearing on the
charges against defendant. Also, the mother's statements to the
daughter were not consistent.243 In view of this, the court held the
victim's statements were not sufficiently trustworthy
to satisfy the
244
second prong of the necessity exception test.

Next to statements to family, friends, and coworkers, most cases
applying the necessity exception have involved statements made by
victims to law enforcement officers. In these cases, the fact that the
statement was made in the course of an official investigation is a
significant factor indicating the trustworthiness of the statement, an
assertion that no doubt confounds defense attorneys. In Jones v.
State,245 the victim of an armed robbery and an aggravated assault left
the country and thus was unavailable to testify at trial. Nevertheless,
the trial court permitted a police investigator to testify about statements
made by the victim. 246 On appeal the court of appeals held that these

statements were sufficiently trustworthy because the victim did not
recant or change his statements, the statements were given in the course
of an official investigation, and the statements 24were
corroborated by
7
others, including, apparently, defendant himself.
In Baker v. State,248 the hearsay statement at issue was made by a
victim of a prior crime allegedly committed by defendant. Both the
charged offense and the prior crime involved allegations of sexual
activities with minors. However, the victim of the prior offense could not
be located; thus, a police officer who interviewed the prior victim was

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. (quoting Ward v. State, 271 Ga. 648, 650, 520 S.E.2d 205, 208 (1999)).
Id. at 656-57, 521 S.E.2d at 826.
Id., 521 S.E.2d at 827.
240 Ga. App. 740, 524 S.E.2d 786 (1999).
Id. at 743, 524 S.E.2d at 789.
Id.
240 Ga. App. 723, 524 S.E.2d 773 (1999).
Id. at 724, 524 S.E.2d at 775.
Id.
241 Ga. App. 666, 527 S.E.2d 266 (1999).
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allowed to testify about statements she made to him.249 With regard
to the trustworthiness of the statement, the trial court concluded, and
the court of appeals agreed, that defendant's admissions during the
investigation of the prior offense and his admissions at trial for the
charged offense sufficiently corroborated the victim's statements and,
thus, the trustworthiness of the victim's statement was not in dispute.25 °
Although the trend is to expand the boundaries of the necessity
exception, the court of appeals concluded the trial court went too far in
Ledford v. State." 1 In Ledford a jury found defendant guilty of
intentional inhalation of paint fumes. To prove defendant's guilt, the
prosecution had to prove that the paint contained one or more proscribed
chemicals-in this case, toluene. The trial court permitted the State to
prove this simply by introducing the paint can allegedly used by
defendant and the label that identified toluene as one of its ingredients. 2 2 Although defendant did not object to the introduction of the
label, the court of appeals nevertheless reversed defendant's conviction,
concluding that the label was hearsay and that hearsay, even though not
objected to, has no probative value; thus, the label could not be used to
uphold defendant's conviction.2 5' The majority rejected the dissent's
assertion that the label was admissible pursuant to the necessity
exception. 254 First, the majority noted no reason existed to think that
a witness was unavailable to establish the contents of the paint can.
The State simply needed to call to the stand a crime lab technician; the
"fact that it would be easier to introduce the can does not rise to the
level of showing 'necessity' pursuant to the necessity exception to the
hearsay rule."255 Similarly, the court did not think that the mere fact
that a label stated the ingredients of the can was sufficiently reliable to
satisfy the trustworthiness requirement of the necessity exception.
Again, the court acknowledged that the prosecutor's burden would be
substantially lightened if it could simply introduce the can, but
and expedience were not relevant to the necessity exception
convenience
25 7
test.

249. Id. at 666, 527 S.E.2d at 267-68.
250. Id., 527 S.E.2d at 268.
251. 239 Ga. App. 237, 520 S.E.2d 225 (1999).
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Id. at 238, 520 S.E.2d at 226.
Id. at 239, 520 S.E.2d at 227.
Id.
Id. at 240, 520 S.E.2d at 227.
Id., 520 S.E.2d at 227-28.
Id., 520 S.E.2d at 227.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

292

[Vol. 52

In dissent, Judge Pope, who was joined by Chief Judge Johnson,
turned to foreign authorities to find support for "an exception to the
hearsay rule when considering labels which are required by law to show
the contents of the container." 258 Based on these cases, Judge Pope
concluded that
[a] necessity for an exception to the hearsay rule is established by the
fact that an array of witnesses would be necessary to qualitatively
analyze the container's contents and to establish production control and
packaging in order to introduce the evidence. Particularized guarantees of trustworthiness for the information contained on these labels
are established by the federal law requiring labels, the ubiquitous use
of product labels in our society, and the common reliance on these
labels. Thus the elements of the necessity exception to the hearsay
rule are 259
present, and the can and its label should be allowed into
evidence.
Judge Pope makes a compelling argument that product labels should be
admissible to prove the contents of the product under some circumstances. However, the majority stated that if the General Assembly
wishes
260
to create an exception for product labels, then it should do so.
For those who think that the necessity exception to the rule against
hearsay may well swallow the rule, the court of appeals decision in
Tyson v.State2 6 will be interesting. In Tyson the trial court permitted
a police officer to testify about a conversation he had with the mother of
a victim of an alleged child molestation. The officer testified that
although the victim denied that she had been molested, he thought the
victim's mother was influencing the victim. 262 Accordingly, the officer
talked to the mother alone and, he said, she told him that she wanted
her daughter to deny the molestation because if her father found out
that the mother had left the child alone with defendant, then the father
"would have sent her back to jail."263 On appeal the court found that
the officer's testimony satisfied the trustworthiness requirement of the
necessity exception because the statements of the mother, who had since
died, were against her interests and thus fell within the hearsay
exception for declarations against interests by one since deceased.2

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 242, 520 S.E.2d at 229 (Pope, J., dissenting).
Id. at 244, 520 S.E.2d at 231.
239 Ga. App. at 241, 520 S.E.2d at 229.
241 Ga. App. 288, 526 S.E.2d 603 (1999).
Id. at 292, 526 S.E.2d at 607.
Id.
Id. at 293, 526 S.E.2d at 607-08.
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Similarly, in Daker v. State265 the trial court, relying on the necessity exception, admitted the out of court statement of a deceased witness.
Defendant contended that the statement was not sufficiently trustworthy
and that the State should not have been allowed to inform the jury that
the witness had died. With regard to the latter objection, defendant
argued that if the jury was informed of the witness' death, it necessarily
would infer that he was responsible for. that death. Accordingly,
26
defendant offered to stipulate as to the unavailability of the witness.
The court of appeals did not reach defendant's second objection because
it concluded that the statement "was admissible under the long
recognized 'spontaneous declaration' exception to the hearsay rule."267
The question is whether it is necessary to invoke the necessity
exception when the statement is admissible pursuant to a well-recognized hearsay exception, or perhaps more to the point, whether the
ubiquitous availability of the necessity exception is leading courts to
admit routinely hearsay evidence without thorough analysis of those
statements.
Finally, defendants continued to meet with less success than
prosecutors in the admission of testimony pursuant to the necessity
exception. In Drane v. State,268 the court held that a codefendant's
statement to a cellmate that he committed the charged offense was not
sufficiently reliable to meet the trustworthiness requirement of the
necessity exception.26 s
D. PriorOut of Court Statements
Georgia has two rather unusual rules regarding the admissibility of
prior statements by witnesses. In Gibbons v. State,27 ° the supreme
court held that prior inconsistent statements of a witness are admissible
as substantive evidence if the witness is subject to cross examination.271 In Cuzzort v. State,272 the supreme court, in apparent frustration over the difficulty of securing convictions in child molestation
cases prior to the enactment of the Child Hearsay Statute, 273 held that
a prior consistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

243 Ga. App. 848, 533 S.E.2d 393 (2000).
Id. at 851, 533 S.E.2d at 398.

Id.
271 Ga. 849, 523 S.E.2d 301 (1999), cert. applied for.
Id. at 852, 523 S.E.2d at 304.
248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982).
Id. at 863, 286 S.E.2d at 722.
254 Ga. 745, 334 S.E.2d 661 (1985).
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (1995).
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against an accused if the witness is present at the trial and subject to
cross examination. 274 The court specifically noted that the "statement
was not limited in value to impeachment but was substantive evidence
of the matter asserted."275
As reported in the surveys for the previous two years, the supreme
court dramatically weakened Cuzzort in Woodard v. State.276 The
court held that prior consistent statements are not generally admissible,
but rather can be admitted only when the veracity of the witness who
made the statement has been placed at issue.277 The court's pronouncement was clear: "Unless a witness's veracity has affirmatively
been placed in issue, the witness's prior consistent statement is pure
hearsay evidence, which cannot be admitted merely to corroborate the
witness, or to bolster the witness's credibility in the eyes of the

jury., 278

The court in Woodard did not expressly address the issue of

whether a prior consistent statement is admissible as substantive
evidence, but it seems implicit in its holding that it is not. If the
statement can only be offered to bolster a witness whose credibility has
been questioned, it seems necessarily to follow that the evidence is not
admissible as substantive evidence.
In last year's survey, the author suggested that the court of appeals
had been slow in its recognition of Woodard. If cases decided during the
current survey period are any indication, it can be argued that the court
of appeals is determined to find a way around Woodard.
For example, in Donaldson v. State,27 defendant contended that the
trial court erred in permitting a nurse to testify with regard to
statements allegedly made by defendant's victim. The court of appeals,
without even mentioning Woodard, rejected defendant's appeal. 28

1

It

simply cited Cuzzort for the proposition that a prior consistent statement
is admissible as substantive evidence if the veracity of a witness is at
issue, the witness is present at trial, and the witness is subject to cross
examination.28 ' Defendant, obviously relying on Woodard, argued that
the veracity of the victim's testimony was not at issue and that,
therefore, the statement was not admissible.2 2 In one sentence, the
court of appeals rejected this contention, concluding that defendant's not
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276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
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282.

254 Ga. at 745, 334 S.E.2d at 664.
Id., 334 S.E.2d at 662.
269 Ga. 317, 496 S.E.2d 896 (1998).
Id. at 320, 496 S.E.2d at 899.
Id.
244 Ga. App. 89, 534 S.E.2d 839 (2000).
Id. at 90, 534 S.E.2d at 841.
Id.
Id. at 91, 534 S.E.2d at 842.
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guilty plea placed the veracity of the victim and her version of events at
issue.28
In Carter v. State,2 the court of appeals acknowledged the existence
of Woodard, but its reasoning may be more exasperating to criminal
defense lawyers than the reasoning in Donaldson. In Carter the trial
court admitted a tape recorded statement made by a police informant.
On appeal defendant contended that the informant's veracity was not in
issue and, indeed, his counsel did not even cross examine the informant.285 The court of appeals rejected this argument.286 Quoting a
concurring opinion from Cuzzort, the court noted that the veracity of a
witness may be placed in issue either "'expressly or impliedly. '' 28 7 The
court concluded that defendant's theory of the case and his version of
events was contrary to the informant's testimony, and this put the
informant's veracity at issue.2 8 8 Therefore, the court held that the trial
court properly admitted the prior consistent statement. 8 9 This, it
seems, is difficult to reconcile with Woodard's pronouncement that prior
consistent statements are not admissible unless the witness' "veracity
has affirmatively been placed in issue."
Toward the end of the survey period, the court of appeals accorded
Woodard a little more respect. In Phillips v. State,2 ° defendant
contended that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of out of
court statements made by two alleged victims. 291 Focusing on Woodard's requirement that the veracity of the witness must be at issue, the
court of appeals agreed and reversed.2 92
Importantly, Woodard held that only if affirmative charges of recent
fabrication, improper influence, or improper motive are raised during
cross-examination is a witness's veracity placed in issue so as to permit
the introduction of a prior consistent statement. Even then, the prior
consistent statement may be admitted as nonhearsay only if it was
made before the motive or influence came into existence or before the

283. Id., 534 S.E.2d at 841.
284. 238 Ga. App. 708, 520 S.E.2d 15 (1999).
285. Id. at 709-10, 520 S.E.2d at 16.
286. Id., 520 S.E.2d at 16-17.
287. Id. at 710, 520 S.E.2d at 16 (quoting Cuzzort v. State, 254 Ga. at 746, 334 S.E.2d
at 663 (Bell, J., concurring specially)).
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Id., 520 S.E.2d at 16-17.
241 Ga. App. 764, 527 S.E.2d 604 (2000).
Id. at 766, 527 S.E.2d at 606.
Id. at 766, 768, 527 S.E.2d at 607, 608.
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time of the alleged recent fabrication. Otherwise, it is pure hearsay,
which cannot be admitted merely to bolster the witness' credibility.293
Clearly, Phillips is not consistent with Carter and Donaldson. In
Phillips the court held that Woodard established that veracity is
challenged only through cross examination."' Carter and Donaldson,
on the other hand, would seem to hold that anything short of a guilty
plea places a prosecution's witness' veracity at issue.
E.

Statements Made for Medical Diagnosis

The court of appeals decision in Barone v. 'Law29 5 may expand
significantly the use of certified copies of medical records. On the other
hand, the decision may raise more questions than it answers. In Barone
the trial court refused to allow defendant to use certified copies of
plaintiff's medical records to contradict her trial testimony that she had
never had prior back, neck, or leg pain. The medical records contained
medical histories apparently obtained from plaintiff that established an
extensive history of back, neck, and leg pain. On appeal defendant
contended that the records were admissible for both impeachment and
substantive purposes. 296 The court of appeals agreed that the records
potentially were admissible and, thus, reversed.29 7
The court first noted that plaintiff's statements to her medical
providers were not hearsay because they were made for purposes 29
of
medical diagnosis for treatment and described her medical history.
Because plaintiff's statements were not hearsay, they were admissible
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 24-9-82, which provides that a "'witness
may be impeached by disproving the facts testified to by him.' ' 299 In
addition, citing Gibbons v. State, 0 0° the court noted that the statements
may have been admissible as prior inconsistent statements.30 '
To this point, the court of appeals reasoning broke no new ground.
However, the trial court held that plaintiff's alleged statements in the
medical records were not admissible because somebody other than

293. Id. at 766, 527 S.E.2d at 607.
294. Id.
295. 242 Ga. App. 102, 527 S.E.2d 898 (2000).
296. Id. at 103, 527 S.E.2d at 899.
297. Id. at 105, 527 S.E.2d at 901.
298. Id. at 104, 527 S.E.2d at 900.
299. Id. at 105, 527 S.E.2d at 900 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-9-82 (1995)).
300. 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982). Gibbons and Cuzzort are used almost
exclusively in criminal cases. It is rare for a court to cite either in a civil case.
301. 242 Ga. App. at 105, 527 S.E.2d at 901.
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plaintiff actually recorded the statements in the records. °2 Although
not entirely clear from the decision, it would appear that the trial court's
point was not that plaintiff's statements were hearsay, but rather that
the documents themselves were, in effect, statements by medical
providers with regard to what plaintiff allegedly told them. The court
of appeals treatment of this issue is significant. The court did not
directly address the question of whether the "statements" of the medical
providers were hearsay. Rather, it held that such records could be used
even though the medical providers are not present at trial if the trial
court is able "to reasonably infer from the face of the records that the
witness was the actual source of the statements at issue." 3
As
examples of situations that would warrant such an inference, the court
listed "first person" accounts, records specifically quoting the patient or
records that "clearly indicate on the face of the records that the only
source of the medical history was the witness, as when the information
reveals something only the witness would know and which could not
come from a third party."0 4 If the medical records did not make clear
that plaintiff was the source of the statements, then defendant would
have to produce additional evidence, presumably the medical provider,
to establish that plaintiff was, in fact, the source of the information.
In a footnote, the court said that it was not necessary for defendant to
call as a witness the custodian of the records, or the medical provider
who actually recorded plaintiff's statement because the documents had
been certified pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 24-7-8, which provides that
certified copies of medical records "'need not be identified at the trial
and may be used in any manner in which records identified at the trial
by the custodian could be used.'"30 5 This footnote should not be taken
as a suggestion that O.C.G.A. section 24-7-8 eliminates any hearsay
issues. It is well established that this code section simply provides an
alternative means of authenticating medical records; it does not address
hearsay issues.0°
It would appear that Barone holds that a witness' statements recorded
by a third party in a document are admissible if the trial court can
reasonably infer that plaintiff was the source of the information
recorded. The fact that the document is, in effect, the statement of a
third party with regard to what the witness said is immaterial. If so,

302.
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304.
305.
306.

Id. at 103, 527 S.E.2d at 900.
Id. at 105, 527 S.E.2d at 901.
Id.
Id. at 104 n.1, 527 S.E.2d at 901 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-7-8(b) (1995)).
Moody v. State, 244 Ga. 247, 249, 260 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1979).
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Barone should make it easier to use documents purporting to record
statements made by a witness.
F

DeclarationsAgainst Penal Interest
In Stanford v. State, °7 the supreme court acknowledged that "[i]t
has long been said that 'Georgia does not recognize a declaration against
one's penal interest as an exception to the rule prohibiting the admission
of hearsay evidence.'" 3"' Or so we all thought. In Stanford the
supreme court explained that this seemingly clear language does not
mean what it very clearly seems to mean. Rather,'"what that means is
that Georgia does not recognize a third party's admission against penal
interest, when that admission exculpates the defendant."3"9 In other
words, a criminal defendant cannot introduce evidence of an out of court
statement by a third party that that party committed the offense for
which defendant is on trial. However, the court held a statement by a
defendant against his penal interest is admissible as an admission of a
party opponent. 1 0
G.

Identification
In White v. State,3' defendants raised a Sixth Amendment challenge
to testimony by a police investigator that two witnesses identified
defendants in pretrial photographic lineups. 31 21 As discussed in a
previous survey, the court of appeals has in the past strongly criticized
Georgia Supreme Court precedent that allows law enforcement officers
to testify that criminal defendants were identified in lineups.313 In
Neal v. State" 4 and Wade v. State,1 5 the court of appeals concluded

307. 272 Ga. 267, 528 S.E.2d 246 (2000).
308. Id. at 269, 528 S.E.2d at 248 (quoting Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 154, 476
S.E.2d 252, 258 n.3 (1996)).
309. Id. at 270, 528 S.E.2d at 249.
310. Id. Unfortunately for the court of appeals, the supreme court's decision came
several months after the court of appeals decision in Kendrick v. State, 240 Ga. App. 530,
523 S.E.2d 414 (1999), in which the court of appeals, "mindful [that] the Supreme Court
of Georgia has stated that Georgia does not recognize a hearsay exception under O.C.G.A.
§ 24-3-8 for statements against penal interest," engaged in admirable gyrations to hold that
defendant's prior guilty plea was an "admission against penal interest," under O.C.G.A.
§ 24-3-31, the exception for admissions by party opponents. Id. at 532 n.1, 523 S.E.2d at
416. Two of the three judges in Kendrick concurred in the judgment only. Id. at 533, 523
S.E.2d at 416.
311.
312.

244 Ga. App. 54, S.E.2d
Id. at 55, _ S.E.2d at _,
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that such testimony was hearsay and its admission deprived defendants
of their right to cross examine the alleged eyewitnesses. However, the
court noted that the Georgia Supreme Court, in Haralson v.State,3 1
held that testimony of this nature is not inadmissible hearsay.31 7 In
Wade the court of appeals analyzed the underpinnings of Haralson and
expressed reservations about its holding."' In Neal the court of
appeals suggests that "[i]t may be time for the Supreme Court to
in which the
reconsider Haralsonor at least limit its application to cases
" 9
identifying witness is available for cross examination. 31
During the current .survey period, however, the court of appeals was
not as concerned with this practice. In White defendants contended that
the trial court improperly allowed a police investigator to testify that two
alleged eyewitnesses identified them as the perpetrators in a photographic lineup."' The court of appeals disagreed, noting simply that
a "law enforcement officer is permitted to testify to a vocal fact of
identification witnessed by himself without its being subject to a hearsay
objection." 2' In addition, the court noted that the officer's testimony
is not hearsay because it is offered not to prove the truth of the matter,
but rather to establish the fact that an identification was made and thus
explain conduct.3 22 This rings hollow. Clearly, the prosecution was
not interested in showing that an identification was made in order to
explain conduct; it wanted to show that a witness told a police officer
that defendant committed the offense. In a footnote, the court cited the
principle that the admission of hearsay evidence does not implicate the
confrontation clause if the statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception.323 The court did not explain what firmly established
exception to the hearsay rule permitted police officers to testify to out of
court statements identifying defendants as perpetrators.
Child Hearsay Statute
The Child Hearsay Statute allows the admission of a child's out of
court statement describing sexual conduct or physical abuse if the child
is available to testify and if "the court finds that the circumstances of

H.

316. 234 Ga. 406, 216 S.E.2d 304 (1975).
317. Id. at 408, 216 S.E.2d at 305.
318. 208 Ga. App. at 701, 216 S.E.2d at 400.
319. 211 Ga. App. at 830, 440 S.E.2d at 719.
320.

244 Ga. App. at 55,

-

S.E.2d at

_.

321. Id.,__ S.E.2d at - (quoting Harper v. State, 213 Ga. App. 444, 449, 445 S.E.2d
303, 308 (1994)).
S.E.2d at.
322. Id. at 54-55,
S.E.2d at.
323. Id.at 55 n.1,
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the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability."3 24 In Roberson
v. State,325 the prosecution sought to rely on the reliability requirement
of the Child Hearsay Statute to justify the admission of patently
inadmissible testimony bolstering the credibility of the alleged victim.
In Roberson the prosecution questioned the mother of the victim about
matters relating to the credibility and veracity of the victim. The
prosecution acknowledged that it was doing just that but contended that
the testimony was admissible because the Child Hearsay Statute
required the prosecution to prove the reliability of the child's statement.326 Calling the State's conduct improper, the court of appeals
soundly rejected the prosecution's argument that the Child Hearsay
Statute warrants the introduction of bolstering evidence before the
jury.3 27 Although the Child Hearsay Statute requires that the court
determine the reliability of the child's statement, this does not open the
door for the prosecution to put before the jury otherwise inadmissible
evidence. Rather, if the evidence tending to prove the reliability of the
statement is otherwise inadmissible, then the court should consider the
evidence in a preliminary hearing outside the presence of the jury.32
In this regard, the court of appeals was particularly irate that the
prosecution opposed defendant's request for such a preliminary
hearing. 2 '
Thus, as the court of appeals said, the prosecution
"attempted to elicit credibility evidence before the jury instead of in a
separate hearing pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16, and this occurred as
33
a direct result of the State's opposition to a separate hearing." 1
While it is true, the court acknowledged, that a separate hearing is not
always necessary, it is clear that "when evidentiary rules conflict with
the provisions of the Child Hearsay Statute, a separate hearing may be
necessary to avoid the presentation of inadmissible matter to the
jury." 3 If the evidence the State wishes to use to prove the reliability
of a statement is otherwise inadmissible,
"that testimony must be
"
received outside the presence of the jury. 332
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EVIDENCE

L

Res Gestae
In prior survey articles, the author has joined those who criticize "that
near-insoluble enigma of our law, which we call res gestae."33 The
admission of hearsay evidence because it is part of the res gestae has no
rhyme or reason, and cases decided during the current survey seemed to
bear that out.
In Boler v. State,a" 4 the court of appeals confirmed the admission of
a Georgia State Patrol officer's testimony that two unidentified
partygoers said that defendant fired a handgun during a high school
graduation party.335 Yet, in Lindsey v. State,335 the supreme court
reversed defendant's conviction because the trial court permitted a
witness to testify that he heard "a member of the crowd
...
33

yell at him

to tell the police that [defendant] was the shooter." 1
In addition to allowing the admission of hearsay evidence, the res
gestae doctrine can be used to admit evidence of other transactions,
evidence that normally would not be admissible as similar transaction
evidence. In Downs v. State,33 defendant was the victim, and probably deservedly so, of this res gestae doctrine double whammy. In Downs
defendant allegedly pushed his wife from a moving car. At his trial, the
court permitted a witness to testify to statements made by the wife
while she tended to the wife's injuries by the side of the road. The
witness testified that the wife said she and defendant had been fighting,
and she discussed previous incidents of abuse by defendant.339 The
court reasoned the statement was not inadmissible hearsay because it
was part of the res gestae 4 ° With regard to defendant's argument
that the admission of testimony about prior incidents of abuse improperly placed his character in issue, the court noted that because the wife's
account of those statements was part of the res gestae of the act at issue,
evidence of the prior abuse was properly admitted. 4 1

333. Andrews v. State, 249 Ga. 223, 225, 290 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1982).
334. 240 Ga. App. 90, 522 S.E.2d 676 (1999).
335. Id. at 90, 522 S.E.2d at 677.
336. 271 Ga. 657, 522 S.E.2d 459 (1999).
337. Id. at 659, 522 S.E.2d at 461.
338. 240 Ga. App. 740, 524 S.E.2d 786 (1999).
339. Id. at 741, 524 S.E.2d at 787.
340. Id., 524 S.E.2d at 788.
341. Id. at 742, 524 S.E.2d at 788. See also Gilbert v. State, 241 Ga. App. 57, 526
S.E.2d 88 (1999) (holding that out of court statements by a Taco Bell employee identifying
the vehicle allegedly used by defendants in a robbery of the restaurant were admissible as
part of the res gestae).
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Ironically, the res gestae doctrine does not appear to be as available
to civil litigants as it is to the prosecution in criminal cases. In Seed v.
Smith & Woods Management Corp.,342 a slip and fall case, plaintiff
attempted to establish defendant's notice of the substance that caused
his fall by testifying to statements made by an unidentified couple to the
store manager that there were spills on the floor that needed to be
cleaned up. 43 "'[E]vidence imputing superior knowledge only at the
suggestion of a statement allegedly made by a mystery person is
completely unreliable. It is the very essence of hearsay.'" 3" This
reasoning is difficult to refute. However, it is fair to ask why a
statement by an unidentified witness is admissible in a criminal matter
but not in a civil trial.

342. 242 Ga. App. 395, 530 S.E.2d 29 (2000).
343. Id. at 396, 530 S.E.2d at 30-31.
344. Id., 530 S.E.2d at 31 (quoting Johnston v. Grand Union Co., 189 Ga. App. 270,
272, 375 S.E.2d 249, 251 (1988)).

